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ABSTRACT 
In 2015, the National Military Strategy of the United States of America listed 
building the capacity of partner nations as a key priority. By building military capacity, 
partner countries can become better equipped to fight ongoing insurgencies, transnational 
terrorist organizations, and other threats themselves, allowing the U.S. to shift focus and 
resources towards other areas that need attention. In today’s battlefield, mobility and 
firepower are of the utmost importance. One capability that can address both of these 
areas is helicopters, which can greatly increase the effectiveness of a military and reduce 
the required number of ground troops (and therefore cost) needed to combat internal 
security threats. This paper seeks to address U.S. efforts to build military helicopter 
capabilities in partner nations and how five factors (perceived threat to the U.S., intended 
enemy countermeasures, terrain, national human capital, and national economics) can 
affect these missions. The cases of Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan will be examined to 
evaluate how the factors in each of these countries contributed to shaping the process and 
effectiveness of the respective U.S. capacity-building mission. This paper concludes by 
comparing the cases and evaluating how important and in what ways these factors 
influence missions, and how this information can be applied to U.S. missions and policy 
in the future. 	
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Introduction 
 Since the end of the Cold War, the West has seen some of its greatest threats to 
security change from powerful state militaries to transnational extremist organizations 
operating from weak or ungoverned states. This shift from focus on large conventional 
conflict to limited wars has rendered less relevant the concept of “strategic air power”1 
given the need to carefully distinguish military targets (Bergerson 1980). Instead, the use 
of “tactical air power”2 in support of ground campaigns, with helicopters playing a 
central role, has become more relevant (Bergerson 1980). In 21st century warfare, 
mobility has become increasingly significant, to the point where helicopters and 
airmobile capability have been called one of the most important factors making a military 
effective (de Durant, Michel, and Tenenbaum 2012). 	
In the current global security environment, it is impractical for the U.S. to 
unilaterally take action against all threats coming from weak and developing states. In 
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, the U.S. lists building the 
capacity of developing states’ militaries as a priority so they will be able to take action 
against threats themselves, allowing the U.S. to become less involved and shift resources 
elsewhere (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2015).  However, no two countries are identical, 
and there are many factors that can influence whether building capacity, specifically in 
regards to military helicopter programs, will be effective. Therefore, it is important to 
																																								 																				
1	Strategic	Air	Power	can	roughly	be	defined	here	as	military	aviation	used	to	directly	bring	about	defeat	
of	the	enemy,	such	as	large-scale	bombing	campaigns	used	in	World	War	Two	to	destroy	strategic	targets	
2		Tactical	Air	Power	can	roughly	be	defined	as	military	aviation	used	in	support	of	the	campaign	on	the	
ground	(Bergerson	1980).	
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determine how certain conditions will influence U.S. missions to build helicopter 
capacity and their associated security outcomes.	
 Despite the limitations of open-source information,3 many studies (e.g. Stinger 
2009; de Durant, Michel, and Tenenbaum 2012; Moroney et al. 2009; Monroe 2008;  
Jones 2014; Grant, Comer, and Ehrhard 2007; JCS 2015) examine helicopter warfare and 
military capacity building, and some with specific focus on air force capabilities.4 Some 
studies that focus specifically on this type of capacity building argue that cost-efficiency 
must be a key priority of air forces in order to make this capacity sustainable (Moroney et 
al. 2009; Monroe 2008). Other studies focus on the tactical application of helicopters in 
warfare. Key findings here include the ability for helicopters to create a large battlefield 
presence with limited forces by allowing quick reaction times and the growing need for 
Special Operations Forces worldwide and the extreme importance of helicopters to their 
missions (de Durant, Michel, and Tenenbaum 2012; Jones 2014; Grant, Comer, and 
Ehrhard 2007). Other important literature pertinent to the effectiveness of helicopter 
capacity building includes the study of economic activity and military spending in 
developing countries (Looney 1987) and the effects of national human capital on military 
performance (Biddle and Long 2004).	
 Despite the body of work currently focused on the concepts of helicopter warfare 
and military capacity building, there are notable deficiencies when it comes to the 
application of both of these concepts together. Research on helicopters and their 
																																								 																				
3 “Open source” information refers to information and literature that is available to the general public, as 
opposed to classified information, which requires a government security clearance to access.	
4	Air forces, in this use, does not mean simply the branch titled the “Air Force,” but all military forces that 
have air capabilities.	
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application in warfare is focused almost exclusively on the perspective of highly 
advanced militaries, such as the U.S., Russia, and other major powers. This causes 
problems because these advanced militaries have the resources to field large, top-of-the-
line fleets and can take on all mission tasks if necessary. In contrast, developing militaries 
have much more limited resources and will have to choose how to prioritize them in their 
contribution to that country’s overall military strategy. Most literature on military 
capacity building is not focused on helicopters, but either focuses on its applicability to 
overall U.S. global strategy or in the case of the more generalized air forces with less 
emphasis on helicopters (JCS 2015; Jones 2014; Monroe 2008; Moroney et al. 2009). 
This has led to a deficiency in research (at least among open sources) when it comes to 
the effectiveness of building helicopter capacity in developing states. 
 The purpose of this research is to generate hypotheses about the effectiveness of 
U.S. efforts to build helicopter capacity in developing partner nations by conducting a 
comparative case study of U.S. missions in the Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This 
study will focus on the relationship among in-country variables (like the presence of 
threats to U.S. security, enemy countermeasures, terrain, economic conditions, and 
human capital), their effects on the helicopter capacity-building mission, and the extent to 
which this new capacity achieves its desired effect. The knowledge this research intends 
to discover should be of particular interest to officials involved in military policy making 
as well as scholars interested in military policy. 	
 The following sections review the unclassified literature to convey a basic 
knowledge of military capacity building, helicopter warfare in modern combat, and in-
country variables important to the process and effectiveness of building helicopter forces. 
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After that, the design and methodology of this research will be explained and the case 
studies of U.S. missions will be analyzed. Finally, I will draw conclusions based on these 
findings in order to generate hypotheses for how the specified factors influence capacity-
building missions and how the U.S. can apply such information going forward. 
 
Building Capacity	
 As the most powerful country and military in the world today, the United States’ 
security advantage is starting to erode in midst of rapid technological development and a 
changing security environment (JCS 2015). Since the attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been engaged in a war on terrorism,5 focusing mostly 
on threats posed by radical extremist organizations based out of weak, unstable states 
(JCS 2015). It even appears in recent years that the number of attacks and recruits to 
terrorist networks are on the rise and these organizations are becoming more threatening 
at home and abroad (Jones 2014). But with the rise of other military powers, such as 
Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China, the United States must shift its focus to the ability 
to combat large conventional forces, while simultaneously continuing to fight the war on 
terrorism (JCS 2015). This shift in focus must also be accompanied by an appropriate 
shift in military resources (JCS 2015).	
 As part of the National Military Strategy of the United States of America,6 the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015) state that creating a strong global network of alliances is a top 
																																								 																				
5	 Commonly referred to as the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) under the George W. Bush administration 
and as “Overseas Contingency Operations” by the Obama administration (Wilson and Kamen 2009).	
6 The NMSUSA is a report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff every five years listing the United States’ 
military’s strategy and goals as part of their contribution to the overall national security strategy. 
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national priority. In order to accomplish this task effectively, allies are broken up into two 
categories: advanced countries7 and “other partners”8 (JCS 2015, 10). To strengthen the 
alliance with other advanced countries, the U.S. uses joint military exercises in order to 
improve interoperability of our forces. These exercises are designed to increase combat 
effectiveness should our forces need to fight alongside one another, against both other 
militaries and extremist organizations (JCS 2015). With “other partners” the primary 
activity taken by the U.S. military is known as capacity building (JCS 2015). 
 Capacity building can be loosely defined as assisting and training a host nation’s 
military in order to increase its military capabilities. In a report titled Building Partner 
Capacity (2013, 1), the Government Accountability Office states, “The United States’ 
national security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to help foreign 
partners and allies build their own security capacity, which is an important aspect of 
sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.” This concept is especially 
important for partner countries with low governmental and policing capabilities, as 
transnational terrorist and criminal organizations can often operate largely unchecked, 
including using that country’s territory as a launching point for operations outside of its 
borders. Figure 1, taken from Jones (2014, 5-6), illustrates that there is a correlation 
between “the capacity of local governments to establish the rule of law in their countries” 
and the level of threat posed to the United States. 	
 By building the capacity of allied and partner militaries, those nations can become 
effective at self-protecting and policing, ultimately allowing our military to fully leave 
																																								 																				
7 Listed in the NMSUSA (2015, 10) as “advanced partners like NATO, Australia, Japan, and Korea.” 	
8 Those considered allies and/or strategic partners but not listed above.	
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the area if these programs remain sustainable (Monroe 2008). This can then help our 
military shift resources in order to increase our focus on combatting rising state military 
powers (Monroe 2008). One method of building partner capacity that can be used to 
achieve U.S. strategic priorities is the creation and development of military helicopter 
programs. 
Figure 1. “Countries of Concern for the United States”	
	
 
Helicopters on the Modern Battlefield	
The earliest military helicopter use dates back to World War II, performing 
support functions on the fringe and rear of the battlefields (de Durant, Michel, and 
Tenenbaum 2012). Shortly after, the first combat applications of helicopters came in the 
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Korean War with the U.S. and in Algeria with the French (de Durant, Michel, and 
Tenenbaum 2012). After Korea, the U.S. developed and refined this new battlefield 
technology and used it to create “unprecedented air mobility” for ground soldiers in 
Vietnam (Menon 2014). The ability for helicopters to work closely with ground forces 
also created large increases in the ability to direct fire for close air support of troops in 
contact (Stinger 2009, Bergerson 1980). 	
Much of modern combat has moved from the “smooth,” “linear” battlefields of 
previous conventional conflicts to “striated”9 spaces and limited wars against extremist 
organizations and insurgency groups (de Durant, Michel, and Tenenbaum 2012; Stinger 
2009). During such wars, helicopters have been able to fulfill many military functions. 
Some of these functions include “intelligence acquisition, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), logistics resupply, transportation of 
combatants and noncombatants, troop induction and extraction and… air-to-ground 
strike” (Menon 2014). Helicopters have become very effective in combat in this regard 
because they are able to compensate for limited ground forces by allowing quick reaction 
times, bypassing terrain barriers, and avoiding improvised explosive devices (IEDs)(de 
Durant, Michel, and Tenenbaum 2012; Menon 2014). Additionally, helicopters can 
provide effective close air support and threat detection to troops in contact (de Durant, 
Michel, and Tenenbaum 2012). Helicopters also play a vital role for Special Operations 
Forces, which have taken on a critical and expanding role in the war on terrorism (Grant, 
Comer, and Ehrhard 2007). 
																																								 																				
9 De Durant, Michel, and Tenenbaum (2012) refer to “striated” space as mountains, jungles, and cities. 
Areas where combatants were usually intermixed with the civilian populations and did not wear uniforms 
or anything to overtly distinguish themselves as combatants.	
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Factors affecting capacity building	
 In order to further U.S. strategic interests, an important question to guide U.S. 
decision making is “where, how, why, and with whom do we build partner capacity?” 
(Moroney et al. 2009, 65). While this paper focuses on only one aspect of “how,” the 
other questions will be looked at using existing literature on conditions that can affect 
missions to build helicopter capacity. By evaluating a partner nation’s threats, intended 
enemy countermeasures, terrain, economic conditions, and national human capital, a 
basic idea of how certain conditions (or sets of conditions) will affect a capacity-building 
mission should be established.	
One of the first conditions the U.S. should evaluate in a country is the perceived 
level of threat to U.S. security interests. This condition is the reason why capacity is built 
in the first place, and the overall effectiveness of a capacity-building mission is measured 
by the new (or improved) capability to combat threats and increase U.S. security. Threats 
can vary in form and severity, both of which should be taken into account when 
determining whether the investment in helicopter capacity is worth the payout of 
potentially increasing security. Some examples of threats against U.S. security interests in 
weak states can include terrorist organizations (either plotting against the U.S. homeland, 
U.S. overseas targets, or U.S. allies and partners), transnational criminal organizations, 
and groups committing human rights violations (Grant, Comer, and Ehrhard 2007). 
Another important condition when evaluating a country is the survivability of 
helicopters. Arguably the most important part of helicopter survivability is “the threat 
environment in which the aircraft must operate,” referring to the possession and use of 
advanced weaponry by intended adversaries (Kopp 2009). Helicopters are much more 
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vulnerable than other military fixed wing aircraft due to their slower flight, low altitude, 
and “high acoustic and radar signatures” (Kopp 2009). For these reasons, enemy 
possession of advanced Man Portable Air Defense Systems10 (MANPADS), early 
warning systems, and effective use of heavy machine guns and rocket propelled grenades 
can serve to negate the tactical advantage that helicopters provide (Kopp 2009). 
The specific terrain inside a country is also of concern, as it is usually not 
expected that a partner’s helicopters will be used on missions anywhere outside of its 
borders when building capacity for internal defense purposes (Mouton, Orletsky, and 
Kennedy 2015). As with all aircraft, helicopter performance is dependent on 
environmental factors; however, due to the nature of helicopters operating close to the 
earth, the operational environment can be even more of a factor than with fixed-wing 
aircraft. Some of the primary environmental concerns are altitude, temperature, terrain 
features,11 and distance (Mouton, Orletsky, and Kennedy 2015). When dealing with high 
altitude and hot conditions, such as in the mountains of Afghanistan, some helicopters 
may not even be able to climb to necessary altitudes carrying a full load of combat troops 
or supplies, let alone take off, land, or hover. This puts a limitation on what platforms are 
combat effective under these conditions, whereas there are more (and often less 
expensive) options for militaries operating in cool, low-altitude areas (Mouton, Orletsky, 
and Kennedy 2015). Distances from a base of operations can also further limit platform 
options, as some may not have the required range or will require in-flight refueling 
capabilities (Mouton, Orletsky, and Kennedy 2015).	
																																								 																				
10 Such as U.S. FIM-92 Stinger missiles or Russian SA-7 SAMs (Kopp 2009).	
11 Terrain features refer to things like mountains, which may cause severe altitude fluctuations.	
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Economic conditions and the effects on defense spending of the partner nation 
also must be taken into consideration given the high costs of acquiring, operating, and 
maintaining a fleet of military helicopters. In advanced countries, such as the U.S., 
government expenditures (including defense expenditures) are generally decided based 
on a perceived need or desirability, and then taxes are levied accordingly (Looney 1987). 
However, developing countries’ expenditures seem to flow in the reverse order. For 
developing nations, a country’s level of government expenditures is usually dependent on 
the ability to collect taxes, which is determined by its economic performance (Looney 
1987). Poor economic conditions can significantly limit developing militaries in the 
amount they are able to self-fund their military, and often governments must request 
military aid or incur debt for funding (Looney 1987). However, economies are never 
static, and levels of expenditures change based on economic conditions, influencing a 
country’s ability to fund the military on its own (Looney 1987). In short, the U.S. must 
evaluate the economic situations of potential partners to determine how much of the cost 
of a new capacity the U.S. will bear and whether that nation will be able to sustain the 
new capabilities over the long term so the U.S. can shift resources elsewhere.	
Another condition important to capacity-building missions that U.S. officials must 
take into consideration when evaluating countries is national human capital. Biddle and 
Long (2004, 531) define human capital as it relates to the military as “the skills, health, 
literacy rates, and educational attainment of the civil population from which soldiers are 
drawn.” Human capital was found to be a predictor variable in determining military 
effectiveness and has a direct correlation with military casualties per enemy killed 
(Biddle and Long 2004; Pilster and Bohmelt 2011). As it relates to high-tech equipment, 
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such as helicopters, Biddle and Long (2004) contend that militaries drawing from pools 
of poor human capital will have difficulty recruiting and training enough capable people 
to effectively utilize highly sophisticated weapon systems. To further the point of this 
effect on helicopters, Biddle and Long (2004, 531) make specific reference to “illiterate 
mechanics [having] great difficulty maintaining high-performance engines.” 
 
Research Design	
 In the previous section, I reviewed the importance of capacity building to US 
security strategy and the role of helicopters in modern warfare. The major factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of helicopter capacity building include the host nation’s 
economic conditions, human capital, terrain, presence of enemy countermeasures, and 
perceived threat to the U.S. Based on current literature, I would expect conditions most 
favorable to helicopter capacity building to include countries that have cool climates with 
low-altitude terrain, a self-sustaining economy, high human capital, and threats that are 
high U.S. security interests and have no or few countermeasures.	
In order to determine how a country’s conditions affect whether U.S. helicopter 
assistance will be effective, I will be performing a comparative case study of U.S. 
missions in Colombia (1999-2016), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-2011). 
These cases all represent instances in which the U.S. engaged substantially in building 
helicopter capacity. These cases vary in significant ways in terms of all of the factors 
previously discussed, and in terms of the level of success of each program. It is likely that 
evaluation of the five factors, when different, can shed light on why cases attained certain 
levels of success. However, because of this variance, it will be difficult or impossible to 
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isolate the impact of each individual variable and determine concrete, independent causal 
relationships. Therefore, all cases will be analyzed in a narrative context to help give 
meaning and significance to the individual variables as they cumulatively contributed to 
the associated outcomes. In addition to analyzing variables in a narrative context, case 
evaluation will be broken up into four sections: country profile, security landscape, 
capacity-building process, and application of the capacity.  
The country profile will include national measures and statistics to give a 
comprehensive idea of where each country stands in relation to each other and the rest of 
the world. These measures and statistics will primarily cover the factors of human capital, 
economics, and terrain. Other than pure statistics (such as literacy rates, GDP, military 
spending budgets, elevation, etc.), the UN Human Development Index and Education 
Index will be used for comparative purposes. The UN’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) “is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have [sic] a decent 
standard of living” (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2015). The 
Education Index is the specific component of the HDI dealing with knowledge and 
education. 
 The security landscape section is designed to give readers a basic understanding 
of the conflict and security situation surrounding the capacity-building mission. Given 
space restrictions, this section in no way intends to completely capture the full breadth of 
each conflict. Instead, this section will be used to highlight the circumstances in which 
the capacity-building mission is taking place in order to give it context. This context will 
become important to give a greater understanding of the process of building capacity and 
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how this capacity contributed to the conflict at large. This section will also address the 
presence of enemy countermeasures and the perceived threat to the United States. 
 The next section will address the capacity-building mission itself. The section will 
describe the mission and its progress in a narrative fashion that is intended to demonstrate 
how the factors contributed to and shaped the overall process. In this narrative, all 
available and relevant information will be included to help explain why the mission 
proceeded how it did. This will include (if available) why certain aircraft were selected, 
how large and fast the force grew, what challenges the mission encountered, and how 
much was spent to create these capabilities. 
 The last section evaluated in each case is the application of the new capability. 
The section seeks to address how the new helicopter capability was used to accomplish 
military objectives. While helicopters can never be credited with achieving strategic 
objectives alone, this section will evaluate how the new capacity contributed as an aspect 
of the overall military campaign and whether it held significant influence (positive or 
negative). Additionally, this section will evaluate the performance of the host nation in 
terms of sustaining this capability when the U.S. withdraws or decreases combat and 
financial presence (if it is applicable). 
 Once all cases are examined, I will make hypotheses about how and to what 
extent each factor influences the capacity-building mission and its associated outcomes. 
Backing up each hypothesis, I will use supporting evidence from the cases to support my 
claim. After presenting these hypotheses, I will conclude by speculating how the 
information and lessons learned from each of these cases can be used to best inform U.S. 
policy towards building helicopter capacity in partner nations. 
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The methodology of this research is based on the case study methodology of 
George and Bennett (1985). In Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (1985, 67), they outline the method of the “structured, focused comparison” of 
case studies:	
The method is “structured" in that the researcher writes general questions that 
reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under 
study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic 
comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 
“focused" in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases 
examined. 
	
This method is best suited for these cases given the variety of political phenomena 
involved in each situation, which will require a focused look at only the aspect of 
building military helicopter capacity and the associated effects. The data on each case 
will be collected in a uniform manner (to the extent that it is possible) that can best 
facilitate finding generalizable information applicable to a set of cases. 	
 One weakness of this study involves the variation in the cases and the lack of 
control for alternative explanations. Given the few instances in which the U.S. engaged in 
helicopter capacity building on a large scale, there is a shortage of historical examples to 
draw from. Another weakness is the lack of concrete measures to assess increases in 
security due to helicopters, especially given that this is simply a capability, which must 
also be accompanied by many other considerations to produce strategic results. However, 
because the objective of this research is to generate hypotheses (and not to discover, 
confirm, or reject the existence of causal bonds between isolated variables), the 
weaknesses of this study still allow for adequate findings to be discovered.	
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COLOMBIA 
Country profile: 
 Colombia is located in the northwest section of South America, where it connects 
to Central/North America at the border of Panama. It is 1,138,910 square kilometers, 
“slightly less than twice the size of Texas” (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2017). 
Colombia’s terrain consists of coastal lowlands, central highlands and mountains (with 
the highest peak at 18,947 feet), and eastern lowland plains, with the average elevation in 
the country at 1,945 feet. The climate in Colombia is tropical along the coast and lower 
elevation areas, and cooler in the central highlands and mountains. Colombia is also 
54.4% forest. A topographical map is shown in Figure 2. 
The literacy rate in Colombia for adults (all those over 15 years of age) was 91% 
in 1996 and has steadily increased to 95% as of 2015 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
2016). For ages 15-24 (those most likely to enter the military), this rate was 97% and 
99%, respectively, for the same years. The mean years of schooling (for those 25 and 
older) was 6.5 years in 2000 and has since increased to 7.1 years in 2013 (UNDP 2015). 
Colombia currently ranks 97 out of 188 countries on the Human Development Index with 
a score of .720 in 2014, up from .629 in 199512 (UNDP 2015). For the same years, 
Colombia was scored as .488 and .621, respectively, on the Education Index. 
 In terms of economics, Colombia had a GDP of 92.507 billion USD13 in 1995 and 
increased to 296.09 billion USD in 2015 (World Bank and OECD 2016). In the most 
recent version of the CIA World Factbook (2017), Colombia had a government revenue 
																																								 																				
12	As	a	reference,	the	U.S.	was	ranked	8	out	of	188	and	scored	.900.	
13	All	numbers	for	GDP	are	adjusted	for	inflation	to	reflect	current	USD.	
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of 76.06 billion USD and expenditure of 84.23 billion USD, running a deficit of -3% of 
GDP (the U.S. ran a -2.9% deficit in this time period). In terms of military spending, 
Colombia has consistently spent between 3.032% of GDP and 3.86% of GDP between 
1999 and 2015 (CIA 2017).		
Figure 2. Topographical Map of Colombia 
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Security Landscape: 
 In 1994, Ernesto Samper was elected president of Colombia amidst allegations 
that he had received support from the Cali Cartel (Long 1995; Zaltzman 2015). Partly to 
combat these allegations, Samper focused much of Colombia’s military resources 
(including aid from the U.S.) towards going after narco-traffickers and drug cartels 
(Zaltzman 2015). While this strategy led to the destruction of the Cali Cartel in the late 
1990s, a vacuum was created that allowed Colombian insurgent forces known as the 
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) to flourish (Long 1995; Mejia 2016, 
Zaltzman 2015). During Samper’s administration (1994-1998), the FARC captured 150 
Colombian municipalities from the government and grew from 9,500 (1994) to 11,300 
(1998) (Zaltzman 2015). In response, many civilians joined paramilitaries out of fear that 
the government couldn’t protect them (CIA 1997). During this same period, 
paramilitaries grew from 2,100 to 4,500 (Zaltzman 2015). 
 In 1998, Andres Pastrana was elected president and placed a large priority on 
creating a peace deal with the FARC early in his administration. At this point in time, 
“only 50-60 percent of Colombian municipalities” were under government control 
(Zaltzman 2015, 6). As part of the negotiation efforts, a demilitarized zone roughly the 
size of Switzerland was established where the military vacated and only the police and 
Colombian government remained (Associated Press 2016; Zaltzman 2015). The FARC, 
uninterested in negotiations, forced out all government and police and took over the area. 
Additionally, during the administration of President Pastrana, Colombia experienced a 
25% increase in kidnappings, 350 democratically elected mayors forced out of office, and 
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an additional 16% percent of Colombian municipalities abandoned by the government. 
The FARC also grew from a force of 11,300 in 1998 to 16,300 in 2002 (Zaltzman 2015). 
 Although during this time period the FARC gained strength, the Pastrana 
administration took steps that would eventually help defeat the FARC. One of the most 
notable steps was initially known as “President Pastrana's Marshall Plan for Colombia” 
(Zaltzman 2015). This plan was developed and authored by Colombian officials, but was 
later modified and received significant input from the U.S. The plan introduced in 1999, 
known as “Plan Colombia,” included large amounts of support from the United States 
and was intended to help decrease production and trafficking of drugs, improve the 
security situation, and help Colombia retake control of its territory (Mejia 2016). It is also 
important to note that as part of this plan, the United States’ primary concern was the 
production and trafficking of drugs, and therefore only authorized military assets donated 
by the U.S. to be used for counter-narcotics purposes (Shifter 2012; Zaltzman 2015). 
Nevertheless, by the end of the Pastrana administration the military was able to start 
winning battles against the FARC in addition to reducing the production of coca.  
 In 2002, Alvaro Uribe was elected president with the belief that the only way to 
address Colombia’s problems was to be in full control of the entire country. His five 
major objectives were: “consolidation of state control over all national territory; 
protection of the population; eradication of illicit drug activity; the development and 
maintenance of a deterrent capability; and the establishment of efficiency, transparency, 
and accountability” (Zaltzman 2015, 45). His new security strategy was carried out with 
support and aid from the U.S. under “Plan Colombia” and through a popularly supported 
“War Tax” (Forero 2002; Zaltzman 2015). 
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 The use of Plan Colombia military assets was still initially restricted to only 
counter-narcotic targets until late 2002, when President Bush issued NSPD-18,14 
officially declaring the FARC a terrorist organization (Mathis 2003; Zaltzman 2015). 
Plan Colombia assets could then be approved on a case-by-case basis to go on missions 
against the FARC. This later changed as well when U.S. personnel were killed in attacks 
by the FARC, and the U.S. changed its policy allowing all assets to attack FARC targets 
without embassy approval in February 2003. 
 With all of the Plan Colombia assets now in play, the military was much better 
equipped to go after the FARC. One of the main additions to the military’s effectiveness 
was the air mobility capabilities added by the Plan Colombia Helicopter Package 
(PCHP), which allowed the deployment of troops to “vulnerable/high risk population 
areas” (Zaltzman 2015, 48). This new ability also allowed troops to take higher risks 
knowing they could quickly receive close air support and medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC), increased the number of mobile brigades from 9 to 17, and created a new 
method of supply allowing troops to continuously occupy more areas once they had been 
cleared.  
 By 2007, attacks by the FARC and paramilitaries had ended and over 350 
municipalities were reoccupied (Zaltzman 2015). In operations “Libertad Uno” (mid-
2003) and “Libertad Dos” (early 2004), the military was able to break the guerilla ring 
around Bogota, take over all core FARC bases in three years, and force the FARC to 
																																								 																				
14The	National	Security	Presidential	Directive	(NSPD)	-	18,	officially	declared	the	FARC	a	terrorist	
organization,	which	authorized	the	U.S.	military	to	assist	in	tracking	down	Colombian	terrorists	with	a	
corresponding	shift	in	resources	“previously	used	in	anti-drug	operations”	towards	operations	against	
terrorist	organizations	(Mathis	2003,	14).	
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disperse into the jungle (Zaltzman 2015). After 2007, Colombia’s military capabilities 
continued to increase and the military began to pursue FARC high-value targets using 
new methods of intelligence gathering and precision-guided munitions (Zaltzman 2015).  
 During Uribe’s administration, the security situation improved dramatically. 
Paramilitaries were demobilized, 22,000 guerillas deserted the FARC and other armed 
groups and entered rehabilitation programs,15 and over 350 municipalities were 
consolidated under government control (CIA 2017, Zaltzman 2015). Crime also 
diminished during this period, from 28,000 murders and 2,800 kidnappings in 2002 to 
15,000 murders and 300 kidnappings in 2009 (Zaltzman 2015). From 2000 to 2013, the 
drug-related economy also dropped from $7.5 billion to $4.5 billion (Mejia 2016). 
 In 2010, Manuel Santos became president with the objective of consolidating the 
gains made by the Uribe administration. At this point, the “FARC no longer represent[ed] 
an existential threat to the [Government of Colombia],” but Santos hoped a peace deal 
could be signed to allow the military to re-focus on criminal gangs and narco-traffickers 
(Zaltzman 2015, 13). Peace negotiations began in 2012, this time with government in 
control of around 90% of municipalities, and a formal treaty was signed in November 
2016 (CIA 2017). 
 In regards to enemy countermeasures, the FARC had not shot down any 
Colombian military helicopters as of July 2013 (McClesky 2013). Although it would 
seem that the use of MANPADS would have been a FARC priority given the 
effectiveness of Colombian helicopters, the FARC did not appear to possess any 
																																								 																				
15	It	should	also	be	noted	that	other	than	those	that	entered	rehabilitation,	many	others	who	deserted	
the	FARC	did	so	only	to	rejoin	criminal	gangs	and	narco-trafficking	groups	(Zaltzman	2015).	
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MANPADS until 2012 (McClesky 2013, Pettersson 2013). Even at this point, it is 
unclear as to how many are possessed and what condition they are in (McClesky 2013). 
As of now, it appears that only one Colombian helicopter has been shot down by the 
FARC, and it was not from MANPADS (Rosser 2015).16 
 
Building the Capacity: 
 Before receiving assistance from the United States, the Colombian military 
possessed some helicopter capabilities. However, this force was considered “primitive” 
and was seriously lacking support in terms of personnel, spare parts, and maintenance 
(Zaltzman 2015, 24). There was poor aviation infrastructure and training programs for 
Colombian pilots and aircraft maintainers. In 1998, a few years before the PCHP would 
take effect, the Colombian Army had eighteen helicopters and the Air Force had forty-
seven.17 
 In 1999, the “Plan Colombia Rotary Wing Security Force Assistance Capability 
Package” (more commonly known as Plan Colombia Helicopter Package, or PCHP) 
comprised around $500 million of the initial $860 million total aid package of the larger 
Plan Colombia (Zaltzman 2015). This package was to include “equipment, training 
institutions, and a national logistics pipeline” (Zaltzman 2015, 38). For aircraft, this 
included the donation of twenty-five Huey-IIs, thirty-one UH-60Ls, and fifteen UH-1Ns 
to the Army and five AH-60Ls to the Air Force, arriving from 2000-2002 (Zaltzman 
																																								 																				
16	It	is	also	contested	as	to	whether	this	helicopter	was	shot	down	at	all	or	was	brought	down	due	to	
mechanical	failure	(Rosser	2015).	
17	These	numbers	only	reflect	helicopters	that	could	be	used	operationally	(i.e.,	not	helicopters	used	for	
training	purposes).	
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2015).18 The flight school at Melgar, which had previously only provided very basic 
training, was greatly enhanced and was given nine OH-58s and fourteen UH-1Ns strictly 
for training purposes (Zaltzman 2015).19 Three additional specialty schools were 
established for aircraft maintainers, including “one for crew maintenance training,” “one 
for engine maintenance,” and “one for advanced avionics” (Zaltzman 2015, 40). The U.S. 
private military corporation DynCorp was also hired to establish and run a logistics 
pipeline to provide the helicopters with supplies, fuel, and spare parts (Zaltzman 2015). 
 The U.S. provided contract pilots and mechanics to help with the fleet until the 
Colombian military could provide trained personnel of its own (Zaltzman 2015). The 
schools were initially run by DynCorp and overseen by U.S. Army Technical Assistance 
Field Teams (TAFTs). The U.S. Army TAFTs were also assigned to assist the Colombian 
Army Aviation Brigade with “advanced aviation tactical planning and techniques” and 
oversee the PCHP fleet in terms of sustainment,20 maintenance, safety, and 
standardization (Zaltzman 2015, 40).  
 By 2007, 218 pilots had graduated the flight school at Melgar21 and the three 
specialty schools had produced 133 mechanics and 165 crewmembers (Zaltzman 2015). 
At this time Colombia possessed 112 helicopters in the Army and fifty-four in the Air 
Force that were all in combat usage against the FARC (Zaltzman 2015).22 DynCorp still 
																																								 																				
18	The	national	police	also	received	2	UH-60s	and	12	Huey	IIs	in	a	different	aid	package	under	Plan	
Colombia	(Zaltzman	2015).	
19	Additionally,	training	for	Colombian	helicopter	pilots	was	also	conducted	at	Fort	Rucker.	
20	Sustainment,	in	this	context,	is	referring	to	primary	objective	of	the	logistics	pipeline:	keeping	
helicopters	properly	supplied	with	support	features,	including	fuel,	spare	parts,	support	personnel,	
weapons,	and	other	supplies.	
21	This	was	“a	700	percent	aggregate	increase	over	7	years”	(Zaltzman	2015,	58).	
22	This	excludes	helicopters	used	solely	for	training	purposes.	
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conducted approximately 70% of training, aircraft maintenance, and sustainment but the 
Colombian military began to take on more of the work (Zaltzman 2015).  
By 2012, the Colombian military acquired 25 more helicopters23 in addition to 
those in the fleet pre-2000 and those donated under the PCHP.24 As of 2015, the training 
school at Melgar “continues to produce world-class pilots” and now trains pilots from 
other Latin American militaries (Zaltzman 2015, 71). Additionally, Colombian military 
personnel now conduct the vast majority of aircraft maintenance and sustainment and run 
the logistics pipeline as DynCorp continues to turn over responsibilities. The Colombian 
military has also created a Joint Air Command Center that is able to monitor the real-time 
status of aircraft and crews and plan, launch, and coordinate operations “within an hour 
of receipt of [actionable] intelligence” (Zaltzman 2015, 70). 
Overall, the PCHP helped create the ability for the Colombian military to have a 
substantial and highly capable fleet of helicopters. According to Mario Zaltzman (2015, 
72),  
The Colombian military is now recognized internationally as global [sic] center of 
excellence and subject matter expertise in respect to development, sustainment 
and execution of a rotary wing capability in the context of counter insurgency 
operations… The PCHP continues to provide Colombia an unlimited pipeline of 
talent in terms of flying, maintaining, and sustaining a large fleet of helicopters. 
 
With the help of the United States, Colombia has been able to develop a very high caliber 
helicopter force, and one that was applied in combat with a great degree of success. 
 
																																								 																				
23	All	of	these	additions	were	to	the	Army’s	fleet,	while	the	Air	Force	remained	constant.	
24	Additional	helicopters	included	39	UH-60Ls,	5	Mi-17,	4	Huey-IIs,	and	7	Si-70s	(Zaltzman	2015).	
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Application of the Capacity: 
 Before the PCHP, the Colombian military helicopter force was poorly equipped 
and organized. It suffered from a shortage of helicopters and pilots and had very poor 
maintenance capabilities (Zaltzman 2015). The pre-2000 helicopter fleet was simply not 
large or advanced enough to meet the demand of the military in its engagements with the 
FARC and “[did] not appear to have been employed in any significant manner” 
(Zaltzman 2015, 26).  
 After the implementation of the PCHP, the capabilities of the Colombian military 
were enhanced greatly, but were limited to only targeting drug cartels and narco-
traffickers. During this time, the better-equipped and supported PCHP helicopters battled 
the drug cartels while the pre-2000 fleet fought the FARC. This policy did cause some 
problems in that PCHP helicopters were initially not even allowed to be used in support 
of police under attack by the FARC, even when their helicopter support was in range and 
could have saved lives (Zaltzman 2015). However, this restriction was eventually lifted.  
 Once the restriction on using PCHP helicopters to target the FARC was lifted by 
the NSPD-18, these helicopters could be used on case-by-case approval by the U.S. 
Embassy. This was later lifted as well and allowed the full helicopter force of both pre-
2000 and PCHP helicopters to target the FARC in February 2003. 
 Immediately when PCHP helicopters were unrestricted, they began supporting 
defensive operations by transporting troops and supplies to remote locations and 
providing MEDEVAC, extraction, or CAS in response to an attack (Zaltzman 2015). 
Later, the helicopter force was used in “Plan Patriota” and “Operation Libertad Dos” to 
allow rapid deployment of Colombian forces to attack the FARC “when they were most 
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vulnerable” (Zaltzman 2015, 59). The full employment of the PCHP now allowed for 
consistent and rapid support for troops in counterinsurgency operations. This meant 
troops could be bolder in their attacks and allowed them to hold remote areas after 
clearing them knowing they had a continuous line of supplies and access to MEDEVAC, 
extraction, CAS, or reinforcements if they needed it (Zaltzman 2015).  
 This new capability, once the PCHP was fully implemented, provided 
“asymmetric military dominance over the FARC” (Zaltzman 2015, 59). It was during the 
following three years after the NSPD-18 where the Colombian military was able to retake 
the majority of its municipalities, major highways, and mountain corridors and 
“systematically” defeat FARC insurgent forces (Zaltzman 2015). 
 In addition to military application against the FARC, helicopters were also used to 
provide transportation for personnel and resources as part of the government’s 
“Consolidation Program” to create government presence and services in remote areas. 
Along with the continuous resupply of military and police in remote areas, this enabled 
the government to create a deterrent to keep the FARC from returning to the secured 
areas. 
 Since the employment of the full PCHP, the FARC “no longer represents an 
existential security threat” and the success of the Colombian military was made largely 
possible by building the capacity of its helicopter program (Zaltzman 2015, 13). 
Helicopters were obviously not the only part of the Colombian counterinsurgency 
strategy and cannot be given all of the credit, but many of the accomplishments of the 
military would have been extremely difficult had it not been for the tactical advantage 
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provided by helicopters (Zaltzman 2015). This case represent one of the most successful 
instances where U.S. efforts to build helicopter capacity has paid off in a major way. 
 
 
IRAQ 
Country profile: 
 Iraq is located in the Middle East, north of Saudi Arabia and west of Iran. It is 
438,317 square kilometers, or “slightly more than three times the size of New York state” 
(CIA 2017). The terrain in Iraq is mostly plains, with mountains close to the northern 
border and some marshes on the eastern border. The average elevation is 1,024 feet with 
the highest point standing at 11,847 in the northern mountains (CIA 2017). Iraq’s climate 
consists of mostly desert with mild to cool winters and dry and hot summers. A 
topographical map is shown in Figure 3. 
 The literacy rate for adults in Iraq was 74% in 2000, increasing to 80% in 2015 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). For ages 15-24, literacy was slightly higher at 
85% and 82% for the same years (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). The mean years 
of schooling in Iraq for those over 25 was approximately 5.8 in 2005 and 6.4 by 2014 
(UNDP 2015). On the Human Development Index, Iraq ranked 121 out of 188, with a 
score of .630 in 2005 and .654 in 2014 (UNDP 2015). On the Education Index, Iraq 
received a score of .574 in 2005; this decreased to .493 in 2010 and 2015. 
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Figure 3. Topographical Map of Iraq	
 
A few years after the 2003 U.S. invasion, Iraq’s GDP was 49.995 billion USD 
(2005)(World Bank and OECD 2016). It has since increased to 380.192 billion in 2013, 
then down to 296.08 billion in 2015 following a drop in the price of oil, the largest 
economic sector and provider of 90% of government revenue (CIA 2017; World Bank 
and OECD 2016). The most recent CIA World Factbook (2017) listed government 
revenue at 52.43 billion USD with a government budget of 77.87 billion (a deficit of -
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16.3% of GDP). Military expenditures for the Iraqi government were 2.88% of GDP in 
2010 and increased to 8.7% of GDP in 2014 following a drop in gas and a rise in the fight 
against ISIS. 
 
Security Landscape: 
 In President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address, Iraq was listed as a part of 
the “Axis of Evil” (Caldwell 2011). In October of that year, Bush also claimed that Iraq 
possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction and a war resolution passed Congress. On 
March 20, 2003, the U.S. military invaded Iraq and had overwhelmed and toppled the 
Saddam Hussein regime by April 9 (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR] 2017).  
 Although “Mission Accomplished” was declared in Iraq on May 1, lawlessness 
and skirmishing continued in the country (CFR 2017). In May, the U.S.-led Coalition 
Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi military and fired all government employees 
associated with Saddam’s Baathist party. These actions led to widespread unemployment 
that contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in Iraq (Dobransky 2014). By 
July of 2003, it was acknowledged that Iraq would be “a classic guerilla campaign” 
(Caldwell 2011, 280). 
 In early 2004, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) launched a wave of suicide attacks that 
killed hundreds and “stok[ed] sectarian resentment” (CFR 2017). In September, U.S. 
troops battled insurgents in Fallujah, where the fighting resulted in an estimated 1,200 
insurgents and 800 civilians killed. By this time the death toll for U.S. troops had reached 
1,000 and Pentagon officials stated that insurgents controlled important parts of central 
Iraq (Caldwell 2011; Crichton, Lamb, and Jacquette 2013). 
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 Heavy fighting continued in 2005 and by October the death toll for U.S. troops 
had reached 2000. In February of 2006, “Sunni extremists destroyed the gilded Shiite 
shrine in Samarra,” which sparked extreme sectarian violence and is referenced as the 
start of “sectarian bloodletting” (CFR 2017). That year, sectarian violence and insurgent 
attacks on security forces increased, IED attacks became more sophisticated and 
dangerous, and some coalition members started to withdraw troops (International 
Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS] 2007). By the end of the year, 34,000 Iraqi civilians 
were killed, the U.S. death toll surpassed 3,000, and President Bush admitted that the 
U.S. was no longer winning the war (Caldwell 2011; United Nations 2007; Crichton, 
Lamb, and Jacquette 2013). 
 In early 2007, Bush announced “the Surge,” a commitment of an additional 
30,000 U.S. troops to Iraq to improve the security situation (CFR 2017). In February, 
28,000 additional troops were actually sent (Caldwell 2011). By this time, it was 
acknowledged by the U.S. that Iraq was in a full civil war (Raz 2007). In addition to “the 
Surge,” the U.S. began recruiting Sunni tribe members to take up arms against AQI in the 
“Sunni Awakening.” Although these two facets were implemented in 2007 and would 
eventually contribute to improving the situation, it was the deadliest year for U.S. troops 
in Iraq. 
 In 2008, the security situation saw an overall improvement and a reduction in 
civilian casualties. By the end of this year, there was an agreement in place to withdraw 
troops by the end of 2011. On June 30, 2009, U.S. troops started to withdraw from cities 
and turn over security responsibilities to Iraqi forces despite skepticism about Iraqi 
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military capabilities. The year 2009 also had the fewest U.S. combat deaths in Iraq since 
the invasion (CFR 2017). 
 By the end of August 2010, the U.S. combat mission officially ended. Around 
50,000 U.S. troops remained behind to continue training Iraqi forces as part of Operation 
New Dawn. As scheduled, all troops, including those training Iraqi forces, withdrew from 
Iraq on December 18, 2011. 
 A few years after the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops, a terrorist 
organization formed from the remnants of AQI and the al-Nusra Front, known as the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began a large military offensive in Iraq in early 
2014 (John 2017). ISIS quickly captured multiple major cities in Iraq and Syria, killing 
many Iraqis and displacing over a million (Cable News Network [CNN] 2016). By June, 
the group announced the formation of a Caliphate, which would carry out brutal 
executions, multiple terrorist attacks, and create a massive refugee crisis (John 2017).  
It is reported that in many instances the Iraqi Army “simply turned and ran in the 
face of an assault by an insurgent force,” allowing ISIS to seize vast amounts of Iraqi 
weapons and vehicles (many donated by the U.S.) from multiple government and military 
bases (Chulov, Haramy, and Ackerman 2014). The U.S. and other countries started 
conducting airstrikes against the group in August 2014 and officially began “Operation 
Inherent Resolve” that October (CNN 2016). By late 2015, Iraqi forces were able to take 
back Ramadi, Tikrit, and the Baiji oil refinery (Glenn 2016; Stanton 2015). 
In 2016, Iraqi forces with the help of various armed groups (including Shia militia 
and Kurdish Peshmerga) were able to take back various cities and strongholds, including 
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Fallujah (CNN 2016). The battle to retake Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, began in 
October of 2016 and continues to the time of this writing. 
In regards to the possession of advanced countermeasures, both during the initial 
U.S. occupation and in the fight against ISIS, there have been numerous documented 
cases of the use of MANPADS (Grossman 2014; CNN 2003). Some of these weapons are 
suspected of having been taken from Iraqi military depots in 2004, as well as stolen by 
ISIS from Syrian airfields (Kimball 2013; Gibbons-Neff 2014). These weapons have 
brought down both U.S. and Iraqi helicopters. 
 
Building the Capacity: 
 During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iraq had the sixth largest air force in the 
world (de Wind 2011). This air force was mostly destroyed during the First Gulf War in 
1991, where large numbers of aircraft were destroyed in the air and on the ground, and 
many Iraqi pilots fled to Iran with their aircraft (de Wind 2011). These aircraft were 
never returned. Before the 2003 invasion, Saddam Hussein believed using aircraft to 
defend the country would be futile against the United States, and none took to the skies to 
combat U.S. aircraft (de Wind 2011). He believed the invasion would be short and he 
would remain in power afterwards, so he stripped and buried many aircraft in the sand. 
No aircraft in Saddam’s air force would ever be used again. 
 After the invasion, a Coalition Provisional Authority order (CPA-22) created a 
mandate to form an Iraqi military, including an air force (Allardice and Head 2007). The 
Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) began in 2004, with only thirty-five personnel, and the Coalition 
Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) was established in November of 2005 (Quigley 
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2007; Bauer 2007). The IqAF “started from almost zero,” but was lucky in that it retained 
“a large cadre of trained and experienced pilots and engineers from before the 2003 US 
invasion” that could create a foundation of leadership and direction (Shuster 2011; 
Associated Press 2012). Nevertheless, this task was still considered a “daunting 
challenge” (Shuster 2011). In terms of the actual building process, the U.S.-led CAFFT 
decided they would “focus on presenting options to the new service, not directing its 
growth,” in this way giving the IqAF more autonomy in how it would develop (Ovel 
2005). 
 The CAFFT first began retraining the old pilots, who were an average age of 
forty-three and hadn’t flown in a long time (Allardice and Head 2007). Recruiting and 
training new pilots and personnel would not take place until late 2007, when the first 
basic training course and flight schools began operating (Allardice and Head 2007; 
Quigley 2007). It was also noted that despite poor conditions and infrastructure, the 
dropout rate in the IqAF was very low and it took roughly the same amount of time to 
train an Iraqi pilot as it did a pilot in the United States (Flores-Janecek 2007; Hoversten 
2008). 
 In 2007, the helicopter fleet was still not well developed and only around three 
helicopters were capable of being flown outside military bases (Curfman 2008). As the 
year progressed, the IqAF began receiving Mi-17 and Huey II helicopters either donated 
by foreign governments or procured by the Iraqi government (Report to Congress 2007; 
Quigley 2007). By 2008, the helicopter fleet had “evolved by leaps and bounds” but was 
still not fully developed (Curfman 2008). It had, however, increased from flying around 
thirty sorties per week in 2007 to near 380 per week the next year (Hoversten 2008). By 
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early 2008, the IqAF’s helicopter fleet consisted of thirty-seven helicopters (IISS 2008).25 
One notable attribute about this fleet is that there were no platforms procured specifically 
for attack, as the IqAF placed more emphasis on transport, CASEVAC, and ISR at this 
time (Allardice and Head 2007; Hoversten 2008; Report to Congress 2007). 
 The CAFFT (changed to Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission - Air Force, or 
ITAM-AF, in 2009) continued to build the IqAF and by 2010 there were 207 total pilots 
and 167 in the training pipeline (Report to Congress 2010).26 The Iraqi government 
continued acquiring more aircraft, which included a deal for twenty-two Mi-17MM, a 
newer model with advanced avionics and defensive suite, and six SA-342 Gazelle with 
attack capabilities (Report to Congress 2010). By early 2010, the IqAF’s helicopter fleet 
consisted of over fifty-eight helicopters (IISS 2010). 
 The U.S. was scheduled to fully withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011, including 
the end of the ITAM-AF mission. Iraq was unable to fully conduct all aircraft and 
infrastructure maintenance capabilities and would require contractor support after the 
U.S. withdrawal (Report to Congress 2010, Slavin 2011). At this point, the IqAF was 
rated as achieving “Minimum Essential Capability” in all areas except air space defense 
and heavy airlift (neither provided by helicopters)(Report to Congress 2010). Although it 
was stated that “U.S. trainers were generally optimistic about [IqAF] pilots,” there was 
still skepticism about whether the IqAF was ready to take over full responsibility (Slavin 
2011). Shortly after leaving, the Iraqi helicopter fleet consisted of seventy-nine 
																																								 																				
25	This	included	14	Mi-17,	2	PZL	W-3WA,	5	Bell	206,	and	16	Huey	IIs		(IISS	2008).	
26	The	total	number	of	pilots	includes	both	fixed	and	rotary	wing	pilots.	
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helicopters: twenty-six Mi-17, six SA-342 Gazelle, ten OH-58, eight Mi-171sh, sixteen 
Huey II, ten Bell 206B3, and three Bell T407 (IISS 2012).  
 After the ITAM-AF officially ended, the Iraqi helicopter fleet was transferred 
from the Air Force to the Army. Iraq continued to expand its fleet, including making a 
deal worth $4.3 billion in 2012 with Russia for the supply of Mi-28 and Mi-35 attack 
helicopters and platform specific training (Donald 2014). As of early 2017, Iraq’s 
helicopter fleet consists of around 154 helicopters (IISS 2017).27 
 
Application of the Capacity: 
 Unlike the case in Colombia, the United States was heavily involved in the 
fighting in Iraq, including the use of U.S. air power. The large and highly advanced U.S. 
fleet worked in conjunction with the Iraqis and contributed to the overall fight in Iraq. 
This meant that any shortcomings in the combat applications of the Iraqi helicopter fleet 
could be supplemented by the use of U.S. air power, so it is difficult to determine the 
effectiveness of Iraqi helicopters before the U.S. withdrew. Even after the U.S. withdrew, 
the next main military conflict in Iraq was the campaign against ISIS, which received 
heavy U.S. and coalition air support since August of 2014 (Terkel 2014). According to 
Iraqi Major Muthanna Hanum, “If we don't have the capabilities to deal with it then the 
coalition is called to handle it” (Daily Mail 2016). 
 In the campaign against ISIS, the helicopter fleet (which was transferred to the 
control of the Army) was still considered “fledgling” but was “deployed [in] full force in 
																																								 																				
27	This	includes	15	Mi-28,	14	Mi-35,	4	SA342,	24	Bell	IA407,	23	H135M,	19	Mi-17	(all	variants),	10	OH-58,	
16	Huey	II,	10	Bell	206B3,	and	19	Bell	T407	
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the battles for Tikrit and Baiji” (Delalande 2016, Daily Mail 2016). This seems to have 
come primarily in the form of airstrikes and close air support performed by the Army 
Aviation’s attack helicopters, which now represent half of all non-training helicopter 
squadrons (IISS 2017, Daily Mail 2016).28 
 With regard to transport and support for foot soldiers, The Military Balance 2017 
stated that most major combat movements of foot soldiers involved deploying from 
armored vehicles, usually “armoured HMMWVs and tanks, often with armoured 
bulldozers” (IISS 2017, 354). With the less restrictive terrain in Iraq, it appears the Army 
is able to better mobilize ground troops with land vehicles. However, one of the most 
effective units in the fight against ISIS has been the Iraqi Special Forces, which does 
receive support from Iraqi Army helicopters for both transport and close air support (IISS 
2016, 2017).  
 Overall, it is difficult to assess the combat application of Iraq’s military helicopter 
fleet. During most major combat engagements, the U.S. and other coalition forces have 
been present to help cover any shortcomings. Additionally, Iraq’s military has not been 
restricted by harsh terrain (like Colombia and Afghanistan) to the point where vertical 
airlift (i.e. non-attack) capabilities become a necessary alternative to ground 
transportation.  
 
 
																																								 																				
28	Many	of	the	primary	attack	helicopters	were	also	acquired	by	Iraq	after	the	U.S.	had	left	and	the	
training	mission	ended.	
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AFGHANISTAN 
Country profile: 
 Afghanistan is located in southwest Asia to the east of Iran and north of Pakistan. 
The country is about 652,230 square kilometers, or “slightly smaller than Texas” (CIA 
2017). Afghanistan consists of primarily rugged mountains with some plains areas in the 
north and southwest of the country. The average elevation in Afghanistan is 6,181 feet 
with peaks that reach a maximum of 24,557 feet. The climate in Afghanistan is “arid to 
semiarid” with cold winters and hot summers. A topographical map of Afghanistan is 
shown in Figure 4. 
 The literacy rate in Afghanistan is very poor. Of all adults, the literacy rate was 
32% (2011) and 38% (2015) for the years available (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
2016). For these same years, people ages 15-24 had a slight improvement with 47% and 
58%, respectively. The mean years of schooling in Afghanistan is also low, ranging from 
2.6 in 2005 to 3.2 in 2014 (UNDP 2015).29 On the Human Development Index, 
Afghanistan ranked 171 out of 188 with scores of .399 (2005) and .465 (2014)(UNDP 
2015). Afghanistan’s Education Index rating was .301 (2005) and .365 (2014). Human 
capital remains a serious problem in Afghanistan, with very low health standards, high 
corruption, and “both capital flight and brain drain;” Afghanistan is “being left behind” 
despite huge amounts of foreign investments (Samin 2016). 
 
 
																																								 																				
29	In	contrast,	the	U.S.	“mean	years	of	schooling”	was	approximately	12.9	during	this	time	(United	Nations	
Development	Programme	2015).	
	38	
Figure 4. Topographical Map of Afghanistan 
 
	
Afghanistan’s economy is also poor; the GDP was 6.275 billion USD in 2005 and 
has since increase to 19.331 billion USD in 2015 (World Bank and OECD 2016). In the 
most recent edition of the CIA World Factbook (2017), the Afghan government’s revenue 
was 1.7 billion USD, yet its expenditures were around 6.639 billion (a budget deficit of -
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28.6% of GDP). Afghanistan’s military spending was 4.74% of GDP in 2011 and 
increased to 28.09% in 2016 (CIA 2017). Overall, Afghanistan is “extremely poor, 
landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid,” the ongoing conflict continues to 
challenge economic growth and contributes to Afghanistan having “living standards 
[that] are among the lowest in the world” (CIA 2017). 
 
Security Landscape: 
 On September 11, 2001, the infamous terrorist attacks on the United States 
shocked the world. The U.S. government quickly discovered that the attacks were 
perpetrated by the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, led by Osama Bin Laden and 
sheltered by the Taliban government in Afghanistan (CFR 2017). Operation Enduring 
Freedom began on October 7 with U.S. CIA and Special Forces teams working with the 
Northern Alliance to destroy Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Conventional forces joined the 
fight twelve days later. During December of 2001, the Taliban surrendered Kabul and 
Kandahar, Osama bin Laden escaped into Pakistan, and the new Afghan government led 
by Hamid Karzai was established.  
 In 2002, President Bush called for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams were established. In May of the next year, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that “major combat” was over that there would be a 
shift from major combat operations to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, this 
did not mean an end to combat.  
 In May of 2005, Presidents Karzai and Bush reach an agreement to “help 
organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces as Afghanistan develops the 
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capacity to undertake this responsibility” (CFR 2017). By this point, the Afghan National 
Army reached a strength of 24,700 troops, although volunteerism was low and desertion 
was high as combat operations became increasingly intense (IISS 2005). In June, the 
well-known “Operation Red Wings” (made popular by the book and movie “Lone 
Survivor”) demonstrated “the Taliban’s continuing ability to carry out tactically 
sophisticated and coordinated operations” (IISS 2005, 226). 
 In 2006, violence increased across Afghanistan. This included the numbers of 
suicide attacks quintupling and remote detonated IEDs doubling. Instability persisted 
because of the continued Taliban insurgency, which was able to profit off high levels of 
opium production and large numbers of illegal weapons (IISS 2006). This led to some of 
the heaviest fighting between the Taliban and NATO and Afghan forces in 2007, which 
saw the international force in Afghanistan begin to look less like a reconstruction force 
and more like a counterinsurgency force. The fighting here also featured large uses of 
airpower by NATO. It is also important to note that at this time the National Intelligence 
Council30 released a report stating that Al-Qaeda, based out of the federally administered 
tribal areas of Pakistan (bordering Afghanistan), was the greatest threat to the United 
States of America (Caldwell 2011). 
 In 2008, troops were still heavily engaged with counter insurgency operations 
against the Taliban while suicide attacks in the country continued to increase (IISS 2008). 
Although losing almost all direct military engagements, the Taliban increased its “areas 
of influence” from thirty districts in 2003 to 160 districts in 2008 (out of 364 total 
																																								 																				
30The	National	Intelligence	Council	is	an	organization	that	“supports	the	Director	of	National	Intelligence	
in	his	role	as	head	of	the	Intelligence	Community	(IC)	and	is	the	IC’s	center	for	long-term	strategic	
analysis”	(Office	of	the	Director	of	National	Intelligence).	
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districts)(IISS 2010, 344). In 2009, the Taliban continued to increase influence in areas 
that previously were not as violent and attacks across the country increased. In December 
of that year, President Obama announced plans to send approximately 30,000 additional 
troops to assist the 60,000-68,000 that were in the country in 2009 (CFR 2017; Caldwell 
2011). This plan mirrored a successful strategic move used by President Bush called “the 
Surge” that was conducted in Iraq in 2007.  
 The overall security situation again worsened in 2010, with the highest number of 
NATO troops killed since 2001, but started to improve somewhat in 2011 with the build-
up of troops (IISS 2011, 2012). ISAF’s ability to clear and hold areas had improved and 
NATO fatalities dropped, however civilian fatalities rose. The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies states that at this time NATO had “cautious optimism” (2012, 27), but 
because countries were continuously withdrawing troops, insurgents were likely going to 
“play the waiting game” (2011, 18).  
 In 2013, Afghan security forces took the lead in security responsibilities and the 
remaining U.S. troops started a shift towards military training and Special Operations 
counter-terrorism missions despite continued heavy fighting (CFR 2017). In 2014, 
Obama announced U.S. troops would be fully withdrawn by 2016 and only 9,800 would 
remain after 2014. In October, NATO formally ended its combat mission even though 
2014 was called “the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since 2001” (British Broadcasting 
Corporation [BBC] 2017). There was also a request for U.S. aircraft to stay engaged 
given the Afghan Air Force had not achieved full capability yet (IISS 2014).  
 Operation Resolute Support started with around 12,000 troops remaining to help 
train Afghan forces, which included Obama delaying the withdrawal of US troops at the 
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request of Afghan President Ghani. In May of 2015, the Afghan government and the 
Taliban held informal peace talks, but the Taliban said they would refuse to stop fighting 
until all foreign troops leave the country. The year 2015 also featured the Taliban 
temporarily capturing the city of Kunduz, considered their “most significant advance 
since being forced from power in 2001” (BBC 2017). 
 In 2016, President Obama again extended the time before U.S. troops will 
withdraw until 2017. This year ISIS also became a security threat in Afghanistan, and in 
June U.S. forces were allowed to accompany Afghan forces in the field and use greater 
U.S. airpower (Sisk 2016). In its most recent report (released January 30, 2017), The 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) stated that the 
security situation has not improved. This included the number of Afghan security forces 
decreasing and both casualties and districts under Taliban control/influence increasing.  
 During the war in Afghanistan, the majority of helicopters shot down have been 
due to enemy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (Walsh 2010, Roggio 2016). 
However, there have been multiple instances where coalition helicopters have had missile 
warning systems activate and pilots reported witnessing surface-to-air missiles in use 
(Walsh 2010). By 2009, U.S. officials acknowledged that the Taliban has tried to use 
MANPADS (specifically, “SA-7 type IRSAMs”) to bring down helicopters (Grant 2010). 
 
Building the Capacity: 
 Although the United States began full combat operations in 2001 and started 
rebuilding the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in 2002, there 
were no efforts to build any Afghan air capabilities until 2006 (Moroney et al. 2009). 
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This began in the fall of 2006 with a comprehensive survey conducted by the U.S. Air 
Force on the air power needs of the ANDSF. Actual building of air capabilities started in 
2007 with the creation of the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC)(Nordland 
2015). 
 Similar to the new foundation of the Iraqi Air Force, the ANAAC started with no 
real air capabilities whatsoever (Sisk 2013; Associated Press 2012). The Afghan air 
forces that were at their pinnacle in the 1980s during the Soviet occupation were left to 
rot under Taliban control and then completely destroyed during the U.S. invasion.31 The 
average age of the pilots that had previously been in Afghanistan’s air force was about 
forty-five years old and most hadn’t flown in over fifteen years (U.S. Air Force 2008; 
VOA 2010). 
 The U.S. recognized early on that the process of building an air force would be 
extremely difficult, even likened to “building an airplane in the middle of flight,” but it 
was seen as a necessity for the ANDSF if it was to eventually take control for itself 
(House 2009; American Forces Press Service 2008). USAF Brigadier General Walter D. 
Givhan stated, “Air power is extremely important in this operational environment… It 
makes sense because of these rocky mountains, the lack of good roads or railroads, the 
forbidding terrain that covers much of the country and the threat of IEDs, that you should 
fly” (American Forces Press Service 2008).  
 From the beginning of this process, the goal was always to make the ANAAC 
(later becoming a separate branch, called the Afghan Air Force, or AAF) fully capable 
																																								 																				
31	It	can	also	be	noted	that	all	of	these	aircraft	were	destroyed	while	still	on	the	ground,	none	were	
destroyed	in	air-to-air	combat.	
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and fully self-sustaining (Schwartz and Alberdeston 2007). Because this new capability 
had to be created from the ground up, it would include the tasks of “acquiring new 
aircraft, training pilots and mechanics, building new facilities, and creasing a logistics 
sustainment system” (Schwartz and Alberdeston 2007). This task was given to the 438th 
Air Expeditionary Wing of the United States Air Force with the training mission 
scheduled to last until 2016. Nevertheless, they are still in Afghanistan and likely will be 
for some time. 
 One of the first steps in creating the ANAAC was re-certifying “legacy” pilots on 
platforms they were familiar with (US Forces Afghanistan 2008). Partly for this reason, 
older Soviet era helicopters (the Mi-35 and Mi-17) were chosen as the first platforms to 
be added to the Afghan fleet (US Forces Afghanistan 2008; House 2009). Additionally, 
USAF Captain Chris Tooman stated that these Soviet platforms were “Extremely reliable, 
we have very few issues with them, they’re perfect for this type of environment” (VOA 
2010). However, the U.S. Department of Defense (2008) stated that it would begin 
looking for replacement options very soon. 
 In addition to acquiring aircraft and retraining old pilots, USAF began making 
contracts to create a logistics and sustainment system, establish schools, and rebuild air 
force infrastructure. Before flight and specialty schools were established, new pilots were 
sent to the U.S. for flight training32 and mechanics and support personnel did on-the-job 
training with USAF personnel (US Air Force 2008). Raytheon was hired to establish 
flight schools for the AAF, which were put in place in 2010, but only started reaching full 
																																								 																				
32	After	receiving	English	language	training,	which	often	took	over	a	year	for	recruits	to	complete.	
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capacity in 2016 (Seck 2016). It was also not until 2012 that the first phase of Afghan 
flight training was able to take place entirely in Afghanistan (Moore 2012).  
 In 2008, the ANAAC started with six Mi-35s and seven Mi-17s (IISS 2008). By 
2011, this had increased to nine Mi-35s and twenty-seven Mi-17s (IISS 2011). Later that 
year the U.S. started to acquire the American-made MD-530F. The selection of this 
aircraft was initially controversial with “legacy” pilots, who accused the aircraft of being 
not powerful enough to operate in Afghanistan’s harsh terrain.33 However, USAF 
justified this decision because it was a light attack platform that was much cheaper and 
simpler to fly and repair than the Mi-35 and it had appropriate attack capabilities given 
the intended targets were “guys with a gun in the back of a pickup truck” (Nordland 
2015). Additionally, this acquisition was also meant to bridge the gap for close air 
support capabilities while the AAF transitioned its primary attack capability from the Mi-
35 (scheduled for retirement) to the fixed wing A-29 Super Tucano (SIGAR 2016).34 
 By the end of the U.S. and ISAF combat mission in December 2014, the AAF’s 
helicopter fleet had grown to five Mi-35s, six MD-530Fs and seventy-two Mi-17s (IISS 
2015).35 The entirety of the AAF had just under 7,000 personnel, including 131 fully 
trained pilots (with an additionaly seventy-six pilots with the Special Mission 
Wing)(Cordesman 2014).36 During this time, the AAF took the lead in providing all 
applications of airpower in support of the fighting in Afghanistan when the U.S. combat 
																																								 																				
33	Nordland	(2015)	also	stated	that	among	the	new,	non-”legacy”	pilots	the	acquisition	of	this	aircraft	was	
popularly	supported	and	well-received.	
34	Up	until	the	introduction	of	the	A-29,	all	AAF	attack	capabilities	were	from	rotary	wing	assets.	
35	This	includes	30	Mi-17	helicopters	that	were	part	of	the	Special	Mission	Wing	(SMW),	an	organization	
tasked	with	flying	for	and	supporting	the	Afghan	Special	Forces	and	counter-terrorism	units.	Most	
information	about	this	unit	is	classified.	
36	The	number	of	pilots	represents	both	fixed	and	rotary	wing	pilots,	although	the	SMW	pilots	are	almost	
entirely	rotary	wing	pilots.	
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mission ended (Smith and Harooni 2016). The U.S. training mission still continued and 
the 438th AEW continued the process of building the AAF. As of the most recent SIGAR 
report (2017), the AAF has forty-six Mi-17s (not including those of the SMW), twenty-
seven MD-530Fs, and three Mi-35s. The initial 2016 deadline to build the AAF was 
missed, and they are “still far from fully capable, let alone self-sustaining” (Sopko 2016). 
In terms of cost, the U.S. alone has spent over $6.5 billion to develop the AAF, with 
additional significant contributions from other countries as well (SIGAR 2015).37 This 
includes the U.S. donating or purchasing the majority of its aircraft (including all fixed 
wing, all MD-530Fs, and thirty-three Mi-17s; most other helicopters were donated by the 
Czech Republic)(SIGAR 2016). 
 Although the U.S. has made progress in building the AAF, there have been major 
challenges to this process. Most of these challenges have been related to human capital, 
which is directly cited by USAF (TAAC-Air 2017). One of the primary problems here is 
illiteracy. According to USAF Colonel Michael T. Needham, “about 85 percent of our 
current recruits are illiterate – and that’s on a good day” (Associated Press 2012). This 
has led to large increases in the time it takes to train pilots and mechanics and has made it 
extremely difficult to recruit personnel (Moroney et al. 2009; Associated Press 2012; 
Smith and Harooni 2016). As of today, there is a large shortage of pilots and aircraft 
maintenance is falling behind operational demand. Additionally, U.S. contractors are still 
required to perform 80 percent of aircraft maintenance while AAF maintainers only 
perform 20 percent (TAAC-Air 2017). 
																																								 																				
37	This	number	is	from	the	data	available	from	SIGAR	during	FY2010-2014,	total	data	was	not	available	to	
them	before	2010.	This	number	also	represents	the	cost	for	the	entire	Afghan	Air	Force,	although	the	
majority	of	its	fleet	consists	of	helicopters	(SIGAR	2015).	
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 The AAF has struggled with retaining pilots, as people with English proficiency 
are in high demand in Afghanistan (Moroney et al. 2009). It is also common to have an 
AWOL rate in the AAF of around 20% (Druzin 2012). AAF personnel have also been 
accused of transporting narcotics using AAF aircraft and nepotism and corruption have 
been cited as frequent problems (Georgy 2012, Druzin 2012). Lastly, a two-decade 
veteran and AAF Colonel by the name of Ahmed Gul executed nine USAF personnel in 
an attack in 2011 that had no connections to the Taliban or any terrorist organization 
(Pawlyk 2016).  
 
Application of the Capacity: 
 When the ANAAC started in 2007, it had very few capabilities and was not able 
contribute in significant ways to the fight. It was also not until May of 2009 that the Mi-
35 made its first flight with Afghans at full flight controls (Pike 2015).  
 When assessing the application of the ANAAC/AAF to the war in Afghanistan, it 
is very important to note that until the end of 2014 the U.S. was still heavily involved in 
combat operations that included the use of aircraft. This is important in that it could cover 
up any of the serious faults of the AAF, which “did not become critical until the [U.S.] 
and coalition turned over fighting to Afghans in 2013-2014” (Collins 2017, 2). During 
this time, however, it was noted by Major General Joseph McConville in 2013 that the 
AAF had greatly improved its capabilities when it came to transporting troops and 
MEDEVAC, although close air support was still a challenge for them (Sisk 2013).  
 Once the U.S. ended its combat mission, the ANDSF took responsibility for the 
security situation. This included the AAF taking over primary responsibility for air 
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missions to support the war, although U.S. aircraft have continued to provide some air 
support, but in a more limited capacity (Smith 2016). Since this time, there have been 
some serious shortcomings in the AAF’s ability to assist the ANDSF.  
 One of the primary problems is that the AAF does not have enough pilots and 
crews to operate all its aircraft. Afghan Major General Abdul Wahab Wardak stated that 
the number of aircraft the AAF possesses is simply not enough to keep up with the 
demand and the fact that there are not enough pilots to operate the entire fleet only makes 
it worse (Smith and Harooni 2016). The lack of aircrews has caused extreme pressure on 
the aircrews that are available and often times they are flying many more hours than they 
should and are “becoming exhausted” (Smith and Harooni 2016). Maintenance has also 
been an issue within the helicopter fleet. In 2015, there was only one of the five Mi-35s 
that was combat capable and a lack of spare parts and maintenance caused constant 
problems keeping the Mi-17s in serviceable condition (Nordland 2015). The Mi-17 fleet 
is also reaching its service age limit and the “will become unsustainable by mid-2018” 
(Marty 2017). 
Aside from the supply of AAF aircraft crews not being able to keep up with the 
demand, close air support has been another serious problem for the AAF. One of the first 
problems here is that there is a reported shortage, with ANA troops “crying out for more 
air support” (Smith and Harooni 2016). Even Mi-17s used for transport have been fitted 
with forward-firing weapons to make them capable of air support and fire missions, 
despite further limiting the number that can now can now be used for transport missions 
(Marty 2017). The lack of air support has put serious pressure on ground troops, who 
likely had become too dependent on close air support previously provided by the U.S. 
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(Schogol 2015; Nordland 2015). Another problem with the AAF’s close air support is the 
high likelihood for civilian casualties. In 2016, the number of civilian casualties caused 
by AAF airstrikes had doubled from the previous year, primarily caused by the MD-530F 
(Snow and deGrandpre 2017).38  
 Overall, the AAF and their helicopter fleet have been considered crucial to the 
fight against the Taliban, yet also are facing serious problems in their combat application 
(SIGAR 2016). The amount of air support given by the AAF is not enough and of low 
quality and aircraft are unable to meet the high demands of the ANDSF. While the 
performance of the AAF is in no way the only factor determining the combat successes 
and failures of the ANDSF, the application of airpower is still a vital component that has 
not been performing to the degree required to defeat the Taliban and improve the security 
situation in Afghanistan. 
 
 
Hypotheses: 
 In the following section, I will present hypotheses for how the five factors I have 
chosen to focus on influenced the capacity-building process and the military effectiveness 
of the new capabilities. These hypotheses will be based upon the three previous cases and 
supported by evidence where one or more factors clearly influenced the helicopter 
capacity-building mission. Each factor will get its own subsection. Additionally, a 
																																								 																				
38	The	vast	majority	of	which	were	caused	by	MD-530F,	which	primarily	conducts	Close	Air	Support	
missions,	while	the	A-29	primarily	conducts	fire	missions	on	pre-selected	targets.	
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summary table of the conditions present in each case and the results of the helicopter 
capacity-building missions are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Case Information 
 
CONDITIONS 
 Colombia Iraq Afghanistan 
Perceived Threat Low/Medium High Extreme 
Advanced 
Enemy 
Countermeasures 
Absent/low High Medium 
Terrain Fair, Restrictive Favorable, Unrestricted Unfavorable, Restrictive 
Economic 
Conditions 
Good Good 
 
Extremely Poor 
National Human 
Capital 
Average Slightly Below Average Extremely Poor 
RESULTS 
 Colombia Iraq Afghanistan 
Growth Fast, Continued Fast, Continued Slow, N/A 
Quality High Medium Low 
Effectiveness High Inconclusive Low 
 
Level of Threat to the U.S. 
 The level of threat to the United States appears to have dictated the amount the 
U.S. was willing to invest in building capacity. The United States made it known that its 
greatest threat was from Al-Qaeda near the border of Afghanistan (and previously 
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sheltered by the insurgency the Afghanistan government was fighting). Accordingly, the 
U.S. also spent the largest amount of money developing the Afghan Air Force and its 
helicopter fleet out of the three cases. Additionally, in Colombia, it was not until NSPD-
18 that PCHP helicopters were able to take on FARC targets. This showed that once the 
U.S. considered the FARC a more direct threat by labeling it a terrorist organization, the 
U.S. authorized its investment in the Colombian helicopter fleet to be utilized in a more 
extensive manner. 
The level of threat to the U.S. did not, however, dictate how well a helicopter fleet 
was able to grow or be utilized. As seen in Colombia, the PCHP was initially given only 
to combat the production and exportation of narcotics, arguably less of a threat than the 
case in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, this case was the most effective instance of the 
three where the U.S. was able to build a high-quality, large, and effective military 
helicopter fleet that played a crucial and positive role in the military campaign against the 
FARC. On the opposite side, the case in Afghanistan saw the largest threat to the U.S. 
and the largest investment, yet the building of the AAF has been the least successful 
instance of the three cases in terms of growth and effectiveness. 
 
Presence of Enemy Countermeasures 
 The threat of advanced enemy countermeasures is difficult to determine given the 
exact defensive capabilities (i.e. flares, chaff, missile detection warning systems) of the 
helicopters in each specific fleet is often classified. However, from what we can learn 
about this, it did appear that this factor has a small amount of influence.  
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 In Colombia, the FARC did not posses MANPADS until 2012, yet the Colombian 
military received an advanced fleet of modern American-made helicopters. In Iraq, where 
the situation with advanced enemy countermeasures was much more severe, its fleet 
consisted of some of the same helicopters (i.e. Huey IIs), but did not receive American 
UH-60L Blackhawks and instead acquired older Soviet Mi-17s. 
 In terms of the influence this factor did have, Iraq did acquire much more 
advanced versions of the Mi-17 (Mi-171sh and Mi-17MM) later in the building process. 
It is unknown if these upgraded versions were specifically for helicopter survivability 
reasons or if there were other factors at play. Additionally, as part of the justification for 
the AAF acquiring the MD-530F, USAF Lieutenant Colonel James Abbott stated, 
“You’re fighting guys with a gun in the back of a pickup truck: How much technology 
does that need?” (Nordland 2015). This is possibly in reference to the MD-530F being a 
suitable platform given it was not intended to go up against a highly advanced enemy that 
possessed advanced countermeasures. 
 Overall, this factor is difficult to determine due to the classified nature of 
helicopters defensive measures. Nevertheless, the presence of advanced enemy 
countermeasures has a small amount of impact on aircraft selection, but not much else on 
the building process. In terms of combat application, it did not appear that the possession 
of enemy countermeasures played a substantial role in determining the effectiveness of 
newly built helicopter capabilities. 
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Terrain 
Terrain, as it relates to affecting flight performance of helicopters, did not have 
much influence. Afghanistan had the most restrictive terrain when it came to altitude, 
terrain features, and heat (especially during the fighting season in the summer, when 
combat activity is highest). Despite this, the AAF’s helicopters were not the most 
advanced, as can be seen by the Mi-35 (well equipped for Afghan terrain) being phased 
out and replaced by the much smaller MD-530F, which has a smaller range and is less 
powerful (Nordland 2015). Additionally, Iraq’s terrain was much lower altitude, yet its 
helicopter fleet acquired more powerful and advanced versions of the Mi-17 than the 
AAF. Colombia also had a more powerful fleet of helicopters even with a lower average 
altitude. Given these instances, I would suggest that terrain, as it relates to affecting flight 
characteristics, does not have much influence in determining the type and quality of 
aircraft that are acquired in the building process. 
On the other hand, terrain had a large effect when it came to restricting the 
movement of soldiers on the ground, making the use of helicopters very effective in a 
military campaign. Evidence of this is most notable when comparing the cases of Iraq 
and Colombia. In Colombia, the military was much better equipped to take on the FARC 
because of the air mobility added by helicopters. This allowed soldiers to insert, extract, 
receive MEDEVAC and CAS, and occupy territories that were previously very difficult 
to access (Zaltzman 2015). This gave them greater presence across the country and 
allowed them to be bolder in their offensives. The ability to move quickly over harsh and 
restrictive terrain is what gave the Colombian military “asymmetric dominance” over the 
FARC (Zaltzman 2015, 1). In Iraq, where most of the terrain is flat, the use of helicopter 
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transport has not been as widespread and most operations against ISIS have used ground 
transportation for the larger deployments of combat troops (IISS 2017). However, Iraq 
has used helicopters effectively for attack and close air support reasons. Therefore, I 
would suggest that the more restrictive the terrain, the more important and effective 
helicopter capabilities will be to a military campaign. 
 
Economic Conditions 
 The economic conditions of a country appear to influence capacity-building 
missions in multiple ways. The first, which may seem rather obvious, is that it dictates 
how much the U.S. must invest to achieve certain fleet sizes. This can be seen in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where the entire air force (including helicopters) had to be built from the 
ground up. In Afghanistan, the U.S. and coalition partners have donated and paid for the 
vast majority of all ANAAC/AAF expenditures, leading to a much larger overall price for 
the capabilities that were built. In Iraq, where the government is able to generate a large 
amount of revenue through the sale of oil, the government was able to purchase many of 
its aircraft with its money. It is also possible that for this reason the IqAF was given more 
autonomy in its growth as a force.39 
 Economic conditions also appear to have a direct effect on the platforms that are 
acquired. One of the primary concerns of capacity building is that the capacity is 
sustainable so the U.S. can withdraw and transfer the costs to the new owner. In Iraq and 
																																								 																				
39	This	was	directly	cited	by	the	U.S.	when	USAF	officials	said	they	would	focus	more	on	“focus	on	
presenting	options	to	the	new	service,	not	directing	its	growth”	(Ovel	2005).	As	opposed	to	Afghanistan,	
where	senior	AAF	members	did	not	support	the	acquisition	of	the	MD-530F,	but	the	U.S.	went	ahead	
anyways	(Nordland	2015).	
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Colombia, where the governments have much higher revenue, newer, more expensive, 
and technologically sophisticated helicopters were acquired than those used in 
Afghanistan. Additionally, part of the reason the Mi-35 was phased out and replaced with 
the smaller and less-equipped MD-530F was concern over the cost to fly and maintain it 
(Nordland 2015).40 
 Lastly, economic conditions affected future growth. In the cases of Iraq and 
Colombia, both were able to continue purchasing additional helicopters without U.S. 
assistance and grow their fleet. It is unknown whether this will happen in Afghanistan; it 
is, however, extremely unlikely given that the AAF will likely require financial assistance 
maintaining its current fleet even after the U.S eventually leaves. 
 
National Human Capital 
 National human capital appears to be one of the most important factors in 
determining the effectiveness of the building process. Human capital was directly cited 
by the United States Air Force as one of the main challenges with building the Afghan 
Air Force (TAAC-Air 2017). This has become evident due to difficulties recruiting and 
training pilots and maintainers that has led to a severe shortage of pilots and available 
aircraft that are not able to meet the demand of the ANDSF. Of the other cases, Colombia 
had the highest rating of human capital and was able to develop the highest quality 
helicopter program that now even trains pilots from other countries. 
																																								 																				
40	Another	important	factor	in	this	decision	was	human	capital	related,	in	that	it	was	easier	to	train	
mechanics	to	maintain	the	MD-530F	than	the	Mi-35.	
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 Additionally, human capital, in conjunction with economic conditions, appears to 
influence the platforms that comprise the helicopter fleet. Aside from concerns over cost, 
the Mi-35 was also replaced by the MD-530F because it was easier for Afghan mechanics 
to maintain and easier to train pilots how to operate (Nordland 2015). While the 
complexity and technological sophistication of helicopter platforms were made simpler to 
meet the requirements of the Afghan Air Force, the Iraqi Air Force was able to acquire 
more sophisticated aircraft that better fit its abilities. The type and abilities of helicopter 
platforms are especially important, as they can directly impact the effectiveness of the 
entire fleet. 
 Overall, while all the factors appear to have had some influence, human capital 
was the most influential in determining the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to build 
helicopter capacity. 
 
Conclusion: 
 On the modern battlefield, helicopters can provide military forces significant 
tactical advantages over insurgent forces with lesser capabilities. This added advantage 
can enable a partner government to take better control over its internal security and assist 
in eliminating transnational threats. Building the capacity of a foreign government can 
therefore increase U.S. security while also allowing the U.S. to focus our attention and 
resources elsewhere. However, the process of building helicopter capacity can be 
complex, costly, and lengthy. 
	57	
 For U.S. strategy going forward, the hypotheses I presented in this paper can help 
give a glimpse at what a helicopter capacity-building mission would look like based on 
the conditions of the five factors in a country of interest. Unfortunately, many countries 
that have internal security problems and harbor transnational threats are often those that 
score poorly in terms of national human capital and economic conditions (Rice 2005). 
Both of these factors have a substantial influence on helicopter capacity-building 
missions and can severely limit the growth, sustainability, and effectiveness of a 
helicopter force.   
Given the complex and expensive nature of this capability, I would recommend 
that the U.S. only embark on a helicopter capacity-building mission in a country of low 
human capital and poor economic conditions when there is a significant tactical 
advantage (such as restrictive terrain) to the possession of helicopters. Otherwise, it may 
be more advantageous to invest in other, more sustainable, capabilities that can provide 
troops mobility and firepower. However, when there is a threat serious to the United 
States and helicopters can help provide a significant tactical advantage to a country 
capable of effectively using them, it is definitely in the U.S. interest to invest in building 
helicopter capacity.  
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APPENDIX 1: Information on Helicopter Platforms 
	
	
AIRCRAFT SPECIFICATIONS1 
Aircraft Manufacturer Manufacturer 
Country of 
Origin 
Type NATO 
Reporting 
Name 
Approximate 
Unit Cost2 
(Millions USD) 
UH-60 Sikorsky  USA Multirole-Medium “Blackhawk” 8.6  
UH-1N Bell3 USA Twin Turbine 
Utility 
“Iroquois” 5 
UH-1H Bell USA Multi-Mission “Huey II”  
OH-58 Bell USA Armed 
Observation 
“Kiowa” 4.9 
206B3 Bell  USA Light Utility “Jet Ranger III”  
T407 Bell  USA Light Utility  1.37 
MD-
530F 
McDonnell- 
Douglas 
USA Light Utility 
Single Engine 
“Cayuse 
Warrior” 
1.5 
Mi-17 MIL Russia Multirole-Medium  “Hip” 9.2 - 10.9 
Mi-171 MIL Russia Multirole-Medium “Hip” 9.2 - 10.9 
Mi-35 MIL Russia Attack “Hind”  
Mi-28 MIL Russia Attack “Havoc” 12  
SA-342 Aerospatiale France Light Utility “Gazelle”  
H135M Eurocopter/ 
Airbus 
UK Light Utility Twin 
Engine 
 5.15 
 
                                                
1 This	table	is	designed	to	provide	basic	information	on	the	helicopter	platforms	previously	referenced.	This	table	
is	not	meant	to	be	used	as	a	comprehensive	comparison	of	the	aircraft	selected	given	there	are	a	variety	of	
important	features	not	addressed	(i.e.	avionics	systems,	cost	per	flight	hour,	defensive	capabilities,	and	possible	
weapons	systems).	Information	was	gathered	in	as	uniform	a	manner	as	possible;	however,	some	performance	
measures	vary	slightly	in	how	they	were	conducted	from	aircraft	to	aircraft	(i.e.	different	altitudes	and	
temperatures,	IGE/OGE,	with	or	without	fuel	reserves,	and/or	Max/standard	AUW) 
2 These	numbers	represent	sales	for	new	helicopters	direct	from	the	manufacturer,	although	many	of	the	
helicopters	donated	or	procured	in	the	cases	were	used	helicopters	with	varying	years	of	previous	service.	Unit	
costs	can	also	vary	significantly	depending	on	the	exact	model,	configuration,	and	systems	of	the	specific	aircraft	
being	procured.	Prices	are	not	adjusted	for	inflation. 
3 Bell	Helicopters	(owned	by	Textron)	is	an	American	helicopter	manufacturing	company	based	out	of	Texas.	This	
company	manufactures	aircraft	both	in	the	United	States	and	Canada.	Aircraft	from	this	chart	produced	in	Canada	
include	the	206B3,	T407,	and	later	production	of	the	UH-1N. 
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AIRCRAFT SPECIFICATIONS (cont.) 
Aircraft Service 
Ceiling 
Hover 
Ceiling 
 
Range 
 
Payload Max 
Cruising 
Speed 
Source 
UH-60 19,140 ft 10,400 ft 363 miles 2,640 lbs 159 kts IHS Jane’s 
1999 
UH-1N 13,000 ft 8,600 ft 284 miles 4,847 lbs 100 kts IHS Jane’s 
1999 
UH-1H 16,210 ft 12,595 ft 284 miles 4,873 lbs 106 kts Bell 
Helicopters 
2016 
OH-58 15,000 ft 6,900 ft 308 miles 2,200 lbs 114 kts IHS Jane’s 
2001 
206B3 13,500 ft 5,300 ft 430 miles 1,490 lbs 115 kts IHS Jane’s 
2006 
T407 20,000 ft 10,450 ft 379 miles 2,585 lbs 133 kts IHS Jane’s 
2006 
MD-530F 18,700 ft 11,600 ft 267 miles 1,510 lbs 135 kts IHS Jane’s 
2011 
Mi-17 15,740 ft 13,055 ft 289 miles 8,820 lbs 135 kts IHS Jane’s 
2011 
Mi-171 18,700 ft 13,055 ft 385 miles 8,820 lbs 124 kts IHS Jane’s 
2011 
Mi-35 14,750 ft 4,920 ft 310 miles 8,377 lbs 145 kts IHS Jane’s 
1992 
Mi-28 18,700 ft 11,820 ft 270 miles 44,090 lbs 145 kts IHS Jane’s 
2011 
SA-342 16,404 9,973 ft 456 miles 1,653 lbs 140 kts Pike 1999 
H135M 9600 ft 6000 ft 394 miles 3,042 lbs 138 kts  IHS Jane’s 
2011 
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